Resource Needs for the Trivalent Oral Polio to Bivalent Oral Polio Vaccine Switch in Indonesia by Holmes, Marionette (Author) et al.
The Journal of Infectious Diseases
Switch Resource Needs in Indonesia • JID 2017:216 (Suppl 1) • S209
The Journal of Infectious Diseases®  2017;216(S1):S209–16
Resource Needs for the Trivalent Oral Polio to Bivalent 
Oral Polio Vaccine Switch in Indonesia
Marionette Holmes,1,2 Taiwo Abimbola,1 Merry Lusiana,3 Sarah Pallas,1 Lee M. Hampton,1 Retno Widyastuti,3 Idawati Muas,3  
Karlina Karlina,3 and Soewarta Kosen3
1Global Immunization Division, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and 2Economics Department, Spelman College, Atlanta, Georgia; and 3Policy Unit, Ministry of 
Health, Jakarta, Indonesia
Background. We present an empirical economic cost analysis of the April 2016 switch from trivalent (tOPV) to bivalent (bOPV) 
oral polio vaccine at the national-level and 3 provinces (Bali, West Sumatera and Nusa Tenggara) for Indonesia’s Expanded Program 
on Immunization.
Methods. Data on the quantity and prices of resources used in the 4 World Health Organization guideline phases of the switch 
were collected at the national-level and in each of the sampled provinces, cities/districts, and health facilities. Costs were calculated 
as the sum of the value of resources reportedly used in each sampled unit by switch phase.
Results. Estimated national-level costs were $46 791. Costs by health system level varied from $9062 to $34 256 at the prov-
ince-level, from $4576 to $11 936 at the district-level , and from $3488 to $29 175 at the city-level. Estimated national costs ranged 
from $4 076 446 (Bali, minimum cost scenario) to $28 120 700 (West Sumatera, maximum cost scenario).
Conclusions. Our findings suggest that the majority of tPOV to bOPV switch costs were borne at the subnational level. 
Considerable variation in reported costs among health system levels surveyed indicates a need for flexibility in budgeting for glob-
ally synchronized public health activities.
Keywords. vaccine switch; cost analysis; resource utilization; Indonesia.
 
Following the declaration of the global eradication of type 2 
wild polio virus (WPV2) in 2015, the continued use of trivalent 
oral polio vaccine (tOPV), which contains attenuated types 1, 
2, and 3 polioviruses, posed an unacceptable risk for creating 
new type 2 circulating vaccine-derived polio viruses (cVDPV2s) 
that could cause paralytic poliomyelitis [1–3]. To address this 
risk, the World Health Organization (WHO) Strategic Advisory 
Group of Experts on Immunization recommended that all coun-
tries using tOPV replace the vaccine with bivalent oral polio 
vaccine (bOPV), which only contains attenuated types 1 and 3 
polioviruses, during April 2016 [4]. This globally synchronized 
switch from tOPV to bOPV required coordinated planning and 
action at global, regional, national, and subnational levels, with 
the potential for significant additional costs to countries for 
planning new policies, health-staff training, supply-chain adjust-
ment, vaccine disposal/recall, and validation of the switch.
The gradual replacement of an existing vaccine with a new vac-
cine should normally have minimal cost implications because the 
existing vaccine would just be used up and then replaced as the 
new vaccine was supplied in its place. The globally synchronized 
switch from tOPV to bOPV was unusual because it required that 
all tOPV use stop during a window of a few weeks detailed in the 
WHO global switch implementation guidelines, that all remain-
ing tOPV be recalled and promptly destroyed, and that bOPV 
be distributed and its use start during the same window of a few 
weeks [5]. The Global Polio Eradiation Initiative (GPEI) provided 
$23.7 million in assistance to pay for the switch in select countries 
at highest risk for a cVDPV2 outbreak or with the greatest finan-
cial need [6]. The WHO switch guidelines encouraged countries 
to establish a new “national switch management committee [that] 
is responsible for securing funds” that could be used to hire addi-
tional staff and cover additional costs associated with the switch 
([7], section 3.3, page 16).
National immunization programs developed estimated bud-
gets during the process of planning the switch with the help 
of coordinated multistakeholder regional and global technical 
assistance. These budgets informed the allocation of funding 
from the GPEI to countries to support the costs of the switch. 
Although the normative prospective budget projections pro-
vided an important basis for resource allocation, empirical 
data on the expenditures and value of in-kind resources used 
in implementing the switch provide an estimate of the actual 
costs of the switch. Such retrospective empirical cost estimates 
can provide valuable information for planning the resources 
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required for potential future vaccine switches or withdrawals 
(eg, a switch from bOPV to monovalent oral polio vaccine 1 or 
the future withdrawal of bOPV).
Accordingly, this article presents results from a retrospective 
empirical economic cost analysis of tOPV–bOPV switch plan-
ning, implementation, and validation in Indonesia. Indonesia 
was chosen for this case study for several reasons. Its large popu-
lation, complex geographic landscape, and middle-income status 
with a per capita income of $3346 made it an important test case 
for the switch [8]; resource requirements in such an environment 
are expected to represent a potential upper bound on switch costs 
compared with lower-income countries or countries with more 
compact geographies and smaller population sizes. In addition, 
although Indonesia’s last identified polio case caused by indige-
nous wild poliovirus (WPV) was in East Java in 1995, the ongo-
ing risk of poliovirus importations is indicated by 351 polio cases 
caused by imported type 1 WPV (WPV1) during 2005–2006 and 
46 polio cases caused by indigenous type 1 circulating vaccine-de-
rived poliovirus (cVDPV1) detected in 2005 [9–11]. Indonesia 
has actively implemented the Polio Eradication and Endgame 
Strategic Plan since 2013 [12]. In 2015, the Ministry of Health 
developed the Indonesia National Switch Plan (INSP), adapted 
from WHO’s global switch implementation guidelines [13]. The 
plan involved all health facilities ceasing use of tOPV and begin-
ning use of bOPV in April 2016, with Biofarma, a parastatal vac-
cine manufacturer owned by the Government of Indonesia, both 
supplying the new bOPV and destroying the old tOPV.
This article addresses the following question: What were 
empirical economic costs of the tOPV to bOPV switch in 
Indonesia? We present costs by (1) health system level (national, 
provincial, district/city, and health facility [HF]); (2) switch 
phase as identified in the WHO global switch guidelines; and 
(3) estimated aggregate costs by sampled province. As a case 
study of a single country, our findings highlight the operational 
features of implementing a global initiative at national and sub-
national levels and suggest directions for estimating resource 
needs and allocating resources to support similar vaccine 
switches and withdrawals in the future.
The evaluation protocol was determined to be not human 
subjects research and therefore exempt from institutional review 
board (IRB) review by the CDC Center for Global Health. The 
evaluation protocol was reviewed by the IRB of the National 
Institute of Health Research and Development, Indonesian 
Ministry of Health and determined to be exempt from further 
IRB review (no. LB.02.01/5.2/KE.267/2016).
METHODS
Site Sample
We estimated the incremental empirical economic cost of the 
switch from tOPV to bOPV at the national level and in 3 selected 
provinces for Indonesia’s Expanded Program on Immunization 
(EPI). We used the methodology as put forth by EPI Costing 
(EPIC) Common Approach to stratify the provinces [14, 15]. 
A convenience sample of 3 provinces was selected: Bali (95.9% 
oral polio type 3 [OPV3] coverage), West Sumatra (83.8% OPV3 
coverage), and Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) (<75% OPV3 cov-
erage) (Table 1). The 3 selected provinces (Table 1) were not 
intended to be representative of all 34 provinces in Indonesia.
Within selected provinces, we stratified according to urban 
area (cities) and rural area (districts) and selected a convenience 
sample of 1 district and 1 city within each province. Districts are 
the next lowest level of health-system administration below the 
provincial level. Finally, within each city and district, we strat-
ified (where possible) according to HF ownership (either pub-
licly owned by the Indonesian government or privately owned 
for-profit or not-for-profit) and selected a convenience sample 
of 1 public and 1 private HF. Private HFs within the sampled 
rural settings were rare; in the absence of a private HF, we sam-
pled 2 government HFs. In each province, we sampled 4 HFs, 
including 1 public and 1 private HF for each city; all rural dis-
trict HFs were public except 1 private HF in Bali province.
Switch Phases
We collected costs for the 4 major phases of the switch defined 
by the WHO global switch guidelines—(1) plan, (2) prepare, (3) 
implement, and (4) validate—using a standard activity-based 
costing method [5, 16, 17]. In Indonesia, the switch was pre-
ceded by a national polio campaign that ensured as many infants 
as possible were vaccinated with existing stocks of tOPV before 
the switch and occurred concurrently with planning for the 
introduction of inactivated polio vaccine (IPV; IPV was intro-
duced in late 2016). By comparison, the INSP was divided into 
the following stages: [1] developing management structures and 
committees (including developing working groups for plan-
ning, implementation, logistics, and monitoring and evaluating 
Table 1. Oral Polio Vaccine Coverage in Sampled Provinces, Cities, and 
Districts1
Geographical area
No. of infants (aged 
<1 y)
4th Series (OPV3) 
coverage rate
Province (high coverage): Bali 70 392 95.9%
 City2: Kota Denpasar 18 763 96.1%
 District3: Karangasem 8550 91.1%
Province (medium coverage): 
Sumatera Barat (West 
Sumatra)
109 336 83.8%
 City: Kota Padang 3615 95.0%
 District: Padang Pariaman 18 845 84.8%
Province (low coverage): Nusa 
Tenggara Barat 
125 752 67.6%
 City: Kota Kupang 11 162 79.4%
 District: Timor Tengah Selatan 10 861 88.2%
Statistics are based on Expanded Progam on Immunization national program office 2015 
immunization coverage. High provincial coverage = OPV3 immunization coverage among 
infants >90%. Medium provincial coverage = OPV3 immunization coverage among infants 
of 75%–90%. Low provincial coverage = OPV3 immunization coverage among infants 
<75%. City = urban area. District = rural area.
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the switch); [2] budget (including securing funding sources for 
the national switch); [3] supply (including ensuring bOPV was 
available at all points of service and HFs and that tOPV was col-
lected and disposed of after the switch); and [4] implementation 
(including tOPV disposal and disposal-site selection, training 
materials and preparation, and switch monitoring). To estimate 
the cost for the switch that could be applicable to similar set-
tings, we mapped the activities within the 4 stages of the INSP 
to the 4 phases of the WHO global switch guidelines (Table 2); 
however, as there is not a one-to-one mapping between the 
activities in the WHO global switch guidelines and those in the 
INSP, we report the costs by the 4 WHO switch phases rather 
than by individual activity. The cost of purchasing bOPV was 
not included in the estimate because this was considered to be 
a cost transfer from the purchase of tOPV (ie, purchased bOPV 
was replacing tOPV that would have been purchased in the 
absence of the switch).
Role of National Expanded Program on Immunization, Provinces, 
Districts, and Cities in Switch Implementation
The National EPI office was responsible for coordinating all 
switch activities throughout the time period of the switch 
phases from July 2015 to June 2016. The responsibilities during 
the switch planning phase included coordination meetings and 
assistance with identifying leaders for the switch throughout 
Indonesia’s 34 provinces. Provincial health offices served as liai-
sons between Indonesia’s vaccine manufacturer and district and 
city health offices, ensuring that all vaccines (including tOPV) 
were adequately stocked until the implementation of the switch 
and that sufficient bOPV was available for districts and cities. In 
turn, district and city offices provided an adequate supply OPV 
to HFs [13]. All levels did not participate equally in all phases 
of the switch. In particular, participation in the validation phase 
varied across the sampled provinces. In Bali, provincial and dis-
trict/city health offices participated in validation-phase activi-
ties, whereas only provincial health offices participated in the 
validation phase in West Sumatra and NTT provinces.
Data Collection Procedures
Structured questionnaires were developed to collect data on the 
resource input types used to execute each phase of the switch, 
including personnel, supplies, equipment, training, travel 
(including vehicle use), and contracted services. The question-
naires were piloted at the provincial and district health offices 
Table 2. Comparison of World Health Organization Global Switch Guidelines and Indonesia Switch National Plan by Phase
Phase WHO global switch guideline activities [6] Indonesian switch national plan activities [5] (activity no. in parentheses)




1. Meetings to select a national switch day; form subcommittees 
on vaccine supply, communications, logistics, process monitor-
ing, and reporting; identify points of contact; and establish an 
operations center to coordinate activities on all levels (national, 
regional, district and facility)
Management committees/structure:
Development of 5 working groups: working group on planning, working 
group on implementation, working group on logistics, working group on 
communication, and working group on monitoring and evaluation (1.0)
2. Meetings to establish the national switch validation committee National Switch Validation Committee: establishment of a committee to 
validate the switch (1.2.1)
3. Conduct an analysis on the supply and distribution of OPV, 
licensing vaccine, establishing private sector provision of OPV, 
establishing communications of vaccine, establishing disposal 
of waste, establishing whether existing expertise exists
 Supply assessments; bOPV procurement and distribution plan (3.1.4)
4. Draft the national switch plan Workplan and timeline of the switch (1.1.3)
Phase II: Prepare 
(August 2015–
March 2016)
1. Secure all funds to hire additional staff and to manage logistics, 
assess tOPV inventory, costs for waste management, and 
training.
Budget: funding and resources (2.0)
2. Develop communication with stakeholders, cold chain person-
nel, logisticians, and health workers.
Implementation preparation: communication (4.3)
3. Develop all training material Implementation preparation: training Materials and preparation (4.4)
4. Includes travel to assess cold-chain capacity or any communica-
tions involving assessment of cold-chain capacity.
Implementation preparation: logistics, cold-chain capacity (4.1.1)
5. Develop strategy or guidelines for disposing of tOPV. Select the 
official disposal sites.
Implementation preparation: tOPV disposal policy and monitoring and dis-






1. Develop roles and responsibilities of switch monitors.  Subnational switch committees (1.1.1.1)
2. Distribution of bOPV at designated time (suggested at 2 weeks) 
before switch.
Supply: bOPV procurement and distribution plan/private sector (3.1.4, 3.1.5)
3. Provide a full day of training on the switch. Implementation preparation: training materials and preparation (4.4)
4. Remove all tOPV from cold chain and disposal. Use a sticker to 
identify any tOPV for disposal.
Implementation preparation: switch monitoring, monitoring process (4.3.5)
Phase IV: Validate 
(April 2016–
June 2016)
1. Identify sites to be validated that tOPV has been removed. tOPV disposal policy and monitoring and disposal site selection (4.1)
2. Record all tOPV information. tOPV disposal policy and monitoring and disposal site selection (4.1)
3. Dispose of tOPV that remains through use of contingency plan. tOPV disposal policy and monitoring and disposal site selection (4.1)
4. Compile report of disposal to validation committee. Implementation preparation: switch monitoring (4.3.5)
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in Jakarta and within a public clinic and revised based on the 
pilot results. The revised questionnaires were administered at the 
national EPI office, 3 provincial health offices, 3 district health 
offices, 3 city health offices, and 12 HFs. Respondents included 
personnel in the selected health facilities (n = 12), district or city 
health offices (n = 6), provincial health offices (n = 3), national 
EPI office (n = 1), and national Biofarma office (n = 1; n = 23 
respondents in total). The questionnaire was administered to the 
same respondent for each phase of the switch. Data were col-
lected on the quantity and price of resources reportedly used for 
each input category. We only examined incremental resources 
expended for the switch that were in addition to the resources 
reportedly used for regular immunization program activities. 
Questionnaires were administered in Bahasa Indonesia by a 
team of data collectors from the Ministry of Health’s Policy Unit 
with technical assistance from US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention staff during June–August 2016. Data were trans-
lated into English and entered and analyzed in Excel.
Cost Analysis
The cost analysis was conducted from the perspective of the 
Indonesian government, including all sources of funding. We 
measured incremental economic costs, including all resources 
reportedly used for the 4 WHO switch phases, including finan-
cial outlays and use of existing or in-kind resources. The time 
frame and analytic horizon for the cost analysis were defined as 
the duration of the national switch in Indonesia, including the 
reported timeline for all 4 phases (July 2015 to June 2016). We 
calculated the costs for each sampled unit (national, province, 
city/district, and HF), switch phase, and resource input type. 
Vehicle and equipment costs were annuitized using a discount 
rate of 3%. All costs are presented in nominal US dollars (USD) 
using the average exchange rate with Indonesian rupiah (IDR) 
for the months of each switch-phase time period (planning 
phase: 13824 IDR to 1 USD; preparation phase: 13762 IDR to 
1 USD; implementation phase: 13255 IDR to 1 USD; validation 
phase: 13311 IDR to 1 USD) [18]. Personnel costs were consid-
ered to be those costs associated with personnel working directly 
with the switch. This includes time spent in meetings and exe-
cuting switch activities as defined in Table  2. Personnel costs 
were calculated as the percentage of time an individual reported 
working on a particular activity multiplied by the monthly wages 
and benefits that person received. Volunteer time for activities 
was valued by applying a monthly salary for a commensurate 
government personnel level to the volunteer’s time based on the 
responsibilities of that person. Supplies and materials donated to 
the intervention were valued at reported market prices.
Subanalysis: Hypothetical Scenarios for Aggregate Switch Costs by 
Sampled Province and for Indonesia’s 34 Provinces
Although our convenience sample of provinces, cities/districts, 
and HFs does not permit statistically valid extrapolation of 
the cost-analysis results, as a hypothetical scenario analysis we 
explored what the aggregate switch costs for Indonesia might 
have been if the remaining 31 provinces had costs similar to 
those observed in our sample. We first estimated the total 
switch costs in each of our 3 sampled provinces for 3 scenarios 
based on applying the median, minimum, and maximum HF 
cost in each province to all HFs in that province, then apply-
ing the city health office costs to all cities in the province, the 
district health office costs to all districts in that province, and 
finally adding the reported provincial health office costs. Based 
on these median, minimum, and maximum scenarios for each 
of the 3 provinces, we then multiplied each scenario cost by 
the 31 remaining provinces and added the reported nation-
al-level costs for the EPI program to each to obtain an estimate 
of aggregate switch costs for Indonesia as a whole. The purpose 
of this subanalysis was to provide a hypothetical range of costs 
against which to compare the national switch budget that was 
developed to advocate for and secure funds for the switch in 
Indonesia ([13], Annex 4).
Data were requested from Biofarma, a parastatal company, on 
their resource inputs for the switch; however, the data received 
were incomplete and were not used in our final analysis. For 
example, Biofarma respondents declined to provide infor-
mation on salaries and the exact number of staff involved at 
each level of its operations in relation to the switch. These staff 
costs in some cases were based on service contracts between 
Biofarma and other companies for operations related to the 
switch at the district, city, and HF levels, which Biofarma con-
sidered to be procurement-sensitive information. Our analysis, 
therefore, does not include Biofarma’s resource contributions to 
the switch.
RESULTS
Costs by Geographic Location, Health System Level, Switch Phase, and 
Resource Input
The estimated national-level EPI program costs were $46 791, 
45% of which was incurred during the switch-planning phase 
(Table 3). Estimated costs ranged from $9062 to $34 256 at the 
province level among the 3 provinces surveyed, from $4576 
to $11 936 among the 3 district-level health offices surveyed, 
and from $3488 to $29 175 among the 3 city-level health offices 
surveyed. There was substantial variation in the reported costs 
by phase of the switch across sampled provinces, health-system 
levels, and HF types (Table 3). In our sample, there was no con-
sistent relationship between costs borne by the provincial-level 
health office and those borne by city-level and district-level 
health offices; in West Sumatra, the provincial-level costs were 
higher than the city/district costs, whereas in Bali and NTT 
at least 1 of the sampled cities/districts had total switch costs 
exceeding those at the provincial level. Summed across all 
switch phases, personnel time represented the largest share of 
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Sumatra District Health Office for which travel costs (includ-
ing per diem) was the largest resource input (Supplementary 
Table 1). No training costs were reported at any level.
Costs by Health Facility Characteristics
Median switch costs per HF varied by geography and ownership 
characteristics (Table 4). Median switch costs per HF were higher 
for rural ($669) than for urban HFs ($244), and higher for public 
($594) than for private HFs ($119). Median switch costs per HF 
were highest in the medium-OPV3-coverage West Sumatra prov-
ince ($704), followed by the low-OPV3-coverage NTT province 
($513), with the lowest median HF cost in the high-OPV3-cov-
erage Bali province ($31). Reported HF switch costs ranged from 
as little as $31 to as much as $2193 for the planning, preparation, 
and implementation phases combined. The HF with the highest 
reported switch cost reported substantially higher costs for the 
preparation and implementation phases ($649 for preparation 
and $897 for implementation) compared with other HFs (mini-
mum $3 for preparation and $510 for implementation).
Subanalysis: Hypothetical Scenarios for Aggregate Switch Costs by 
Sampled Province and for Indonesia’s 34 Provinces
Hypothetical scenarios for aggregate switch costs are 
presented based on the cost scenarios derived from the 
convenience sample of three provinces (Tables 5 and 6). This 
subanalysis is intended as context for the INSP proposed 
switch budget and should be interpreted with caution con-
sidering the small convenience sample of provinces, cities/
districts, and HFs, which were not intended to be represen-
tative of all such units in Indonesia. These hypothetical sce-
narios produced estimated total per-province costs ranging 
from $113 567 (Bali, minimum scenario) to $857 911 (West 
Sumatra, maximum scenario), with a median per-province 
cost across scenarios of $278 367 (NTT, minimum scenario). 
For the estimated total province cost, the minimum scenario 
refers to the extrapolation of the lowest cost HF for all HF 
costs in the province, whereas the maximum scenario refers 
to the extrapolation of the highest cost HF for all HF costs in 
the province. In each scenario, the sampled city and district 
costs were applied to all cities and districts in the province. It 
is noteworthy that the INSP proposed switch budget of $16.9 
million falls within the range of the hypothetical scenarios 
of aggregate estimated costs for Indonesia as a whole, which 
ranged from $4 076 446 (Bali, minimum scenario) to $28 
120 700 (West Sumatera, maximum scenario), with a median 
aggregate cost across scenarios of $9 185 270 (NTT, mini-
mum scenario).
Table 3. Estimated Switch Costs by Health System Level and Phase (Study Sample)
Health-system level Phase 1 (Plan) Phase 2 (Prepare) Phase 3 (Implement) Phase 4 (Validate) Total Phases 1–4
National
EPI program $20 958 $18 514 $6077 $1242 $46 791
Bali Province
Provincial health office $4081 $1510 $2951 $519 $9062
District health office (n = 1) $5876 $5095 $757 $208 $11 936
City health office (n = 1) $1668 $1490 $294 $36 $3488
West Sumatra Province
Provincial health office $12 112 $15 756 $6060 $328 $34 256
District health office (n = 1) $1043 $2427 $1106  $0 $4576
City health office (n = 1) $3390 $2754 $280  $0 $6424
NTT Province
Provincial health office $3071 $2405 $2964 $1132 $9572
District health office (n = 1) $1204 $3886 $739 $0 $5829
City health office (n = 1) $16 454 $11 063 $1657 $0 $29 175
Table 4. Switch Costs per Health Facility by Geography and Ownership Characteristic (Study Sample)
Facility characteristic Median total switch cost Minimum switch cost Maximum switch cost
Rural health facilities (n = 6) $669 $31 $2193
Urban health facilities (n = 6) $244 $90 $629
Public health facilities (n = 8) $594 228 $2193
Private health facilities (n = 4) $119 $31 $467
Bali health facilities (n = 4) $204 $31 $777
West Sumatra health facilities (n = 4) $704 $90 $2193
NTT health facilities (n = 4) $513 $282 $629
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DISCUSSION
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that vaccine withdrawal 
or recall does not entail additional costs, global partners thought 
the tOPV–bOPV switch would require additional resources, as 
evidenced by the global switch guidelines that include recom-
mendations for resource mobilization as well as the financial 
assistance provided by GPEI to country governments to sup-
port the hypothesized extra costs of switch implementation [5]. 
Indonesia was one of the largest recipients of the GPEI switch 
funds, and its own national switch budget was >$16 million, 
including both domestic and external funding. Although global 
partners and country governments hypothesized that the switch 
would require additional resources, our study is the first to 
examine whether there is evidence to support this hypothesis. 
The findings of this case study provide evidence of the addi-
tional cost at the country level of a global synchronized vac-
cine withdrawal event, which to our knowledge does not exist 
in the published literature on vaccine costs. Although our case 
study examined only a convenience sample of provinces, cities, 
districts, and HFs in Indonesia, our results represent the first 
country-level data on the reported costs of this globally syn-
chronized vaccine switch.
Our findings suggest that the majority of the switch costs 
were borne at the subnational levels. In part, this is expected, 
given the decentralized nature of Indonesia’s government and 
health system; however, it highlights the important contribu-
tions (many in-kind) by provincial, city, and district govern-
ments and by HF staff, as well as the importance of adequate 
budgeting for subnational coordination and implementation 
for future switches. In our study sample, the majority of switch 
costs were incurred during the planning and preparation 
phases, primarily reflecting personnel time spent on planning 
and coordination meetings. Costs during the implementa-
tion and validation phases were lower than might have been 
expected for the core activities of implementing and validating 
the switch. Validation-phase involvement was limited to some 
health-system levels (eg, there were no validation-phase costs 
reported at the HF level), which may also explain the smaller 
share of costs for activities in this phase.
Lessons Learned and Implications for Policy and Practice
Our findings suggest that in-kind contributions of countries 
to program costs of the switch were substantial, even though 
these are not traditionally reflected in financial costs presented 
in budgets. The variability in estimated switch costs across 
provinces, districts, and cities suggests a need for flexibility 
in budgeting for immunization activities involving multiple 
health-system levels. Attempting to force a rigid approach to 
budgeting upon all levels (eg, a flat amount per administration 
unit) would likely lead to suboptimal performance, particularly 
in a country as varied as Indonesia in which different levels of 
government may play different roles in planning, implementa-
tion, and monitoring across different areas.
Although training was a major activity outlined in the 
global guidelines and Indonesian switch plan and budget, our 
respondents reported no training costs incurred at any level 
(Supplementary Table 1). This may reflect prevailing perceptions 
around training as formal classroom delivery of new content at 
a dedicated time and place, for which transport costs and a per 
diem are paid to participants. Information about the switch that 
may have been conveyed through in-service training methods, 
such as at monthly meetings of HF staff at district or city health 
offices or during supervision visits, might not have been per-
ceived as training by respondents. Training on the switch might 
also have been incorporated into trainings on other topics (eg, 
IPV introduction and planning for a national immunization 
day) such that respondents did not report any training on the 
switch per se. The reported limited investment in training may 
also reflect resource constraints because the external resources 
Table 5. Estimated Aggregate Switch Costs for Each Sampled Province
Province
Median scenario (assuming median health 
facility cost in each province)
Minimum Scenario (assuming minimum health 
facility cost in each province)
Maximum Scenario (assuming maximum 
health facility cost in each province)
Bali $143 987 $113 567 $244 848
West Sumatra $366 565 $163 947 $857 911
NTT $374 695 $278 367 $422 694
Estimates are hypothetical and intended to provide context for comparison with Indonesia’s switch budget.
Table 6. Estimated Aggregate Switch Costs for Indonesia (34 Provinces + National Expanded Program on Immunization Costs)
Province used as basis for extrap-
olation to other 31 provinces
Median scenario (assuming median 
health facility cost in each province)
Minimum scenario (assuming minimum 
health facility cost in each province)
Maximum scenario (assuming maximum 
health facility cost in each province)
Bali $5 348 842 $4 076 446 $9 115 744
West Sumatra $12 248 758 $5 638 246 $28 120 700
Nusa Tenggara Timur $12 500 792 $9 185 270 $14 628 964
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that Indonesia received from GPEI were less than requested. 
One implication for future vaccine switches and withdrawals 
may be that when resources are constrained, countries can find 
more efficient options than formal training (with its associated 
costs for transport, per diem, and venue) for transmitting infor-
mation to subnational health authorities and HF staff.
We did not find a clear correlation between costs and vac-
cination coverage; although previous studies of immunization 
service delivery costs have used immunization program perfor-
mance as a basis for sampling, our results suggest that coverage 
as a measure of immunization program performance may not 
be an informative basis for resource allocation at the subna-
tional level to support similar vaccine switches or withdrawals 
in the future. Although some costs (eg, cold chain) are shared, 
the costs of the switch appear to have not been associated with 
vaccination coverage, perhaps reflecting the difference in core 
activities (eg, planning meetings vs vaccine administration).
Limitations
Our findings should be interpreted in light of several limitations. 
We used convenience sampling for provinces, districts/cities, 
and HFs; therefore, the site sample may not be representative of 
all such sites in Indonesia. We did not collect data on the popu-
lation served for the HFs in our sample, and thus we could not 
compare costs across HFs based on catchment population. Also, 
we did not include either the cost of bOPV distribution to all 
peripheral levels or Biofarma’s costs of destroying tOPV remain-
ing after the switch due to missing information and quality of 
data received. Furthermore, our results may be subject to recall 
bias, as is possible with all retrospective cost data collection 
relying on respondents to recall time spent or resources used, 
possibly leading to personnel costs or other expenses being over-
estimated or underestimated. Respondents’ answers were solic-
ited by self-report and not validated through document review 
(eg, accounting, stock, or health records) because the cost anal-
ysis was designed to be a program evaluation and not an audit. 
Moreover, respondents were unable to provide cost information 
for some activities when such information was deemed to be 
procurement-sensitive (eg, cost of Biofarma distribution service 
contracts in each province); total costs are therefore underesti-
mated. In addition, the switch in Indonesia was implemented 
simultaneously with several other immunization interventions, 
including IPV introduction and national immunization week 
2016. It is therefore possible that some incremental costs of the 
switch are underreported by respondents because they were 
associated with or attributed to these parallel activities. Our 
analysis adopted a government perspective and therefore does 
not include contributions made by external partners that were 
not channeled through the government (eg, GPEI funding to 
support WHO national program officers).
Furthermore, we were unable to provide insight into poten-
tial shared costs with IPV introduction. Although IPV was 
scheduled to be introduced in Indonesia in June 2016, its intro-
duction was delayed due to delivery constraints and did not 
overlap with the implementation of the tOPV-to-bOPV switch 
(which covers the period from July 2015 to June 2016); how-
ever, some preparatory activities for IPV introduction, such as 
training or planning meetings, may have overlapped with the 
switch. Although our questionnaire and data-collection team 
specifically asked about additional resources used only for 
the switch, it is possible that respondents may have attributed 
overlapping activities fully to IPV introduction or fully to the 
switch, leading to either an underestimate or overestimate of 
switch costs.
CONCLUSIONS
This cost analysis of the tOPV-to-bOPV switch in Indonesia pro-
vides evidence of the reported resource contributions at all levels 
of the Indonesian health system to implement the switch. For all 
phases of the WHO global switch guidelines, we documented 
resources reportedly used for the phases of the switch, providing 
another lens on programmatic reports of the extent of switch plan-
ning and implementation. The initial INSP budget estimates for 
the switch were in the range of aggregate switch costs we present 
here based on a convenience sample of provinces, cities/districts, 
and HFs, although our cost estimates may be underreported due 
to recall bias and the integration of the switch with other concur-
rent vaccination activities. The empirical retrospective economic 
cost estimates presented here indicate that, although there was 
likely considerable variation in the resources used as reported to 
carry out the switch across provinces, cities, districts, and HFs, 
overall the switch’s resource needs were likely manageable. This 
suggests that the resource requirements for the future withdrawal 
of bOPV are likely to be similarly manageable at a country level.
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